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Abstract. According to the Jericho forum, the trend in information secu-
rity is moving the security perimeter as close to the data as possible. In
this context, we suggest the idea of data-based access control, where de-
cryption of data is made possible by knowing enough of the data. Trust is
thus based on what someone already knows. A specific problem is defined
as follows: given n pieces of data, an agent is able to recover all n items
once she knows k of them. The problem is similar to both secure sketches
and secret sharing, and we show that both can be used as a basis for con-
structions. Examples of possible applications are granting access without
credentials, recovering forgotten passwords and sharing personal data in
social networks.
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1 Introducing data-based access control
1.1 Motivation
According to the Jericho forum [4], traditional boundaries in information se-
curity are disappearing. Organisations are flexible and outsource part of their
processes, employees work from home and mobile devices contain loads of
data. Instead of relying on firewalls, the protection should therefore lie as close
to the data as possible. In this paper, we address this issue from the perspective
of access control.
In general, mainstream access control relies on two separate mechanisms:
authentication and authorisation. It is first determined if the user has the claimed
identity, and based on this identity certain privileges or trust are assigned. In a
de-perimeterised setting, however, we may not be so sure anymore about the
identity of persons, or the current privileges that should be coupled to it. Because
people join and leave organisations on a regular basis, information about their
identity may well be outdated. Especially when roles of persons change often
and are not administered timely, identity can be an unreliable intermediary. In
this context, the question can be asked whether the two steps can be merged
into a single one. Can we trust people without knowing their identity?
Often, authentication and authorisation of persons is based on what a person
knows. Normally, this is a username-password combination or a key. We radi-
calise this idea here, and focus on whether it is possible to let any piece of data
serve as part of the access control policy. More specifically, we concentrate on
access control policies in which the data protects itself. That is, an agent acquires
access to new data based on the data it already possesses. We call this approach
data-based access control. In the data-based access control approach, identity is
no longer the focal point of authorisations. Instead, authorisations are coupled
directly to credentials. These credentials can be any form of data: passwords,
keys, files, or other pieces of data.
As an example, consider an electronic health record of a patient. We assume
here that the file resides in a protected form on a public server. Either the
authorities or the patient herself will have to administer the access policies for
the file. How can they set the access control such that a practitioner can update
her copy of the file to a new version, without first having to authenticate herself?
Most importantly, how can we assign the access rights for the current file without
relying on authentication? Basically, practitioners that have been treating the
patient before will possess an earlier version of the medical file, including part
of the information of the new version. This means that the patient can grant
access to the updated version based on the earlier version as a credential. Apart
from practical challenges in managing such access rights, the key feature is that
these rights are based on data rather than special credentials.
If the patient does not trust the possessors of the previous version anymore,
she may set a different access policy for the new file, in which an additional
credential is required. She may then distribute this credential to the trusted
practitioners via a different channel. How such policies can be implemented
will be discussed in the following. The main point is that it is possible to base
access control on information rather than identity.
In this paper, we define the characteristics of data-based access control and
the associated policies as a new framework for data protection. We also show
that existing cryptographic primitives can be used to implement the policies.
The main contribution of this paper is therefore the definition of a new research
area and its connection with already existing cryptographic primitives.
1.2 Problem statement
Data-based access control is a form of access control where the possibility of
decryption is protected by the data itself, not by separate credentials such as
keys or attributes. Data-based access control is based on similarity between what
the user wants to know and what she already knows. The central assumption
is that if one already knows much within a specific domain, one has the right to
know more.
Definition 1. Data-based access control is the granting of access to information
based on the similarity between the information being accessed and the information
provided to access it.
In this paper, we introduce (k,n) threshold data-based access control. More
precisely, if from a set of n data-items the agent already knows k, she can recover
the remaining items. Also, when the agent knows fewer than k, the uncertainty
about the remaining items is equal to or only negligibly smaller than the entropy
in each data item.
1.3 Applications
Data-based access control may be used for various purposes:
– authorisation without identification, where trust is based on what an agent
already knows;
– recovering forgotten passwords; if an agent uses n passwords, she may store
these in such a way that she can recover one if she remembers the other n−1;
– sharing data in social networks; people may want to reveal more to people
who already know a lot about them;
– secure version management; access can be granted to a new version of a file
based on knowledge of earlier versions.
1.4 Related work
Developments in the direction of data-level security include sticky policies
[6] and attribute-based encryption [8]. The sticky policies paradigm involves
the idea that policies can be associated to data in such a way that they are
enforced by the association mechanism itself. Attribute-based encryption is
such a mechanism.
In attribute-based encryption [8], the possibility of decryption is dependent
on the receiver’s attributes rather than her knowledge. These attributes have
been verified by a key authority, which has issued a key corresponding to these
attributes. In data-based access control, there is no independent key authority,
since possession of part of the data immediately proves that one is entitled to
know the rest.
An idea similar to data-based access control is the fuzzy vault [5]. There, a
secret value is “locked” by a set of public values. If a sufficiently close set of
public values is input, the vault can be unlocked. In a fuzzy vault, however, the
elements for unlocking the vault are from a publicly announced domain, which
is different from the secret we wish to protect. This is not the case in data-based
access control: here, the elements for unlocking are themselves also the secrets.
Data-based access control can be conceived as a secure sketch problem. A
secure sketch [1] is a procedure that maps a secret value to a public bit string,
where the public bit string plus an approximation of the secret value allow for
recovery of the secret value, provided the approximation is close enough. Both
problems involve the publication of information that allows one to reconstruct
the original data if one can approximate the original data closely enough. In-
deed, the information published in data-based access control can be thought of
as a secure sketch, namely one in which the distance measure is the set differ-
ence between the stored data-items and the remembered data-items. However,
secure sketches have been mainly applied to problems where the input data is
inherently fuzzy (like biometrics), where characteristics of the biometric tem-
plate can be described in terms of feature sets. In this paper, we focus on the
(k,n) threshold data recovery problem instead, where it may or may not be
allowed to approximate some or all of the individual items. Also, as opposed
to secure sketches, data-based access control is not focused on error correction.
For decryption, an agent should input exactly k known values, not n values of
which at least k are correct.
An approach similar to data-based access control was suggested for au-
thentication purposes [3]. In this “personal entropy” scheme, an authentication
secret is divided using Shamir’s secret sharing [9]. For each share, a question
together with the correct answer allows one to decrypt the share of the secret.
The scheme that is proposed may also be applied in data-based access control.
In the current work, however, the essential feature is that it is the data itself that
is being protected, not an authentication key.
Recently, it was proposed to use digital objects as passwords [7]. The objects
used in that framework are public information such as music or pictures rather
than protected information. Also, the approach is again focused on acquiring a
key rather than accessing the protected data directly.
1.5 Outline of the paper
In section 2, we introduce the principles of data-based access control. In section
3, we describe a possible solution for the problem of (k,n) threshold data-based
access control based on polynomial interpolation. In section 4, we show how
an order-invariant scheme can be devised using secure sketches. In section 5,
we discuss our prototype system. In section 6, we provide some suggestions for
asymmetric schemes. In section 7, we evaluate the approach and solution. In
section 8, we conclude and suggest further research.
2 Principles
In the traditional approach of access control, there are two phases: authentica-
tion and authorisation. Authentication specifies how the possession of certain
credentials establishes an identity. Authorisation specifies how a certain identity
leads to access.
Data-based access control does not distinguish a priori between credentials
and data. It assumes a distribution over the participating agents of data-items
from the set that we are interested in (U) and defines how access to these items
is related to access to other items. In the notation, we useD for sets of data items
and D for individual data items.
We can distinguish between non-interactive and interactive forms of data-
based access control. In interactive forms, agents can execute a protocol, which
in the end provides the desired distribution of data (figure 1). In non-interactive
forms, an agent publishes its data on a public bulletin board with the policies
“attached”, after which other agents with the appropriate possessions can access
it. We focus on non-interactive forms here.
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Fig. 1. Interactive data-based access control. Alice, Bob and Charlie each possess a set of
messages. They wish to share all of their messages with another person if they already
share at least two.
A data-based access control policy consists of a domain U and a function
P(U)→ P(U), mapping sets of required items to sets of items that the required
items give access to (P denotes power set). A policy is well-formed if a) data-
items give access to themselves, and b) more data-items give access to more
data-items.
Definition 2. A data-based access control policy is well-formed if for each mapping
D1 7→ D2:
– D1 ⊆ D2, and
– for each data item D and mappingD1 ∪ {D} 7→ D3:D2 ⊆ D3.
The intuition here is that one already has access to the data-items one supplies as
credentials, so a policy denying this access would not be enforceable. Moreover,
if a set of data-items does not give one access to a specific piece of data, but a
subset does, one can use the subset instead and still get the piece of data. ?Thus,
again, such a policy would not be enforceable.
Example 1. We give an example of a well-formed policy:
– ∅ 7→ ∅
– {D1} 7→ {D1}
– {D2} 7→ {D2}
– {D3} 7→ {D3}
– {D1,D2} 7→ {D1,D2,D3}
– {D1,D3} 7→ {D1,D2,D3}
– {D2,D3} 7→ {D2,D3}
– {D1,D2,D3} 7→ {D1,D2,D3}
We show that the fourth line satisfies the requirements. Trivially, {D3} is a sub-
set of itself (first requirement). Also, adding a data item gives the mappings
{D1,D3} 7→ {D1,D2,D3} and {D2,D3} 7→ {D2,D3}. In both cases, {D3} is a subset
of the image (second requirement). The requirements can similarly be verified
for the other lines.
We distinguish between symmetric and asymmetric data-based access control.
Symmetric access control can only be used with symmetric policies. A symmetric
policy is a well-formed policy in which the items in the rules are equivalent: if
I can get a by knowing b, then I can also get b by knowing a. More precisely, if I
can get any additional item D based on a set of known items {D1...Dn}, I can also
retrieve any item from this set if I do not know that item, but I do know D.
Definition 3. A data-based access control policy is symmetric if it is well-formed, and
for each mapping D1 7→ D2, for which D1 ∈ D1, D2 ∈ D2 and D2 < D1, there also
exists a mapping (D1 \ {D1}) ∪ {D2} 7→ D3, where D1 ∈ D3.
Example 2. The policy of the previous example is not symmetric. With D1 and
D2, one can get D3 (fifth line), but when reversing D1 and D3, one cannot get D1
with D2 and D3 (seventh line).
Symmetric data-based access control is the focus in the current work; some ideas
on asymmetry are discussed in section 6. More specifically, we focus on (k,n)
threshold data-based access control.
Definition 4. A data-based access control policy for universeU is a (k,n) threshold
policy if:
– |U| = n,
– for eachD ⊆ U with |D| ≥ k,D 7→ U, and
– for eachD ⊆ U with |D| < k,D 7→ D.
Lemma 1. A (k,n) threshold policy is symmetric.
Proof. We first prove that a (k,n) threshold policy is well-formed. Because D
either maps toU or to itself, the first requirement of well-formedness is satisfied,
sinceD is both a subset of itself and ofU. Furthermore, in the first case, |D| ≥ k
and therefore |D ∪ {D}| ≥ k.D∪ {D} will thus also map toU, which is a subset
of itself, proving the second requirement. In the second case,D∪ {D} will map
to eitherD∪ {D} orU, of both of whichD is a subset.
To prove that a (k,n) threshold policy is also symmetric, we look at the policy
ruleD1 7→ D2 and distinguish again the cases |D1| ≥ k and |D1| < k. In the first
case, D2 = U. For any D1 ∈ D1 and D2 < D1, |(D1 \ {D1}) ∪ {D2}| = |D1| ≥ k.
Therefore, the new set will also map to U, of which D1 is a member. In the
second case, D2 = D1 and there will be no item D2 satisfying the condition
D2 ∈ D2 and D2 < D1. Symmetry is thus trivially achieved. uunionsq
A construction for (k,n) threshold data-based access control is defined by two
operators:
– an encryption function Enc, taking as input n data-itemsU = {D1...Dn}, the
value k and outputting a public string P;
– a decryption function Dec, which takes as input the public value P and k
data-items T = {T1...Tk}, and yieldsU if and only if T ⊆ U.
(k,n) threshold data-based access control should satisfy the following security
properties:
– knowledge of k items allows exact reconstruction ofU;
– knowledge of fewer than k items reveals no additional information (in-
formation theoretic security) or only a negligible amount of information
(computational security) about any of the other individual items;
– applying Dec with a set of items that is partially correct should not give
information about which items are correct.
We can distinguish between direct and indirect data-based access control. In the
former, the remaining data-items can be recovered without any intermediate
secret value that protects the data. In the latter, knowledge of enough data-
items allows for recovering a key for a conventional encryption algorithm that
can be used to decrypt the full data-set. Because the latter relies on standard
encryption techniques, the security will typically be computational rather than
information theoretic.
The forms of data-based access control discussed here can be used in securing
various types of databases. To enable this in practice, we need schemes that
actually realise the desired properties. In the following, we will propose such
schemes for (k,n) threshold data-based access control.
3 A polynomial interpolation scheme
3.1 Shamir’s secret sharing
Shamir [9] introduced a scheme for secret sharing based on polynomial curve
fitting. Secret sharing involves dividing a secret D into n parts, of which k are
necessary and sufficient to reveal the secret. The idea is to define a polynomial of
degree k−1, usingD as one of the coefficients and choosing the others randomly,
and generate n points on the polynomial as the parts of the secret. Because the
degree is k − 1, k shares will suffice to reconstruct the coefficients and thus the
secret.
In Shamir’s scheme, the coefficients are chosen randomly, except for the coeffi-
cient that represents the secret. This makes it possible to limit the degree of the
polynomial to k. However, in data-based access control, we have n data-items
to fit into the polynomial. It is not possible to represent these as n points on a
polynomial of degree k − 1, because in general n points will not lie on a single
polynomial of this degree.
3.2 Direct scheme
We present two possible solutions. The first is to represent the data-items as n
points uniquely defining a polynomial of degree ≤ n − 1. Assume that we have
n data-items Di (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and an injective two-way function h mapping data-
items to numbers below a prime p. We now define a polynomial f of degree
≤ n− 1 inZp by the n points (i, h(Di)). If we then publish n− k additional points
on the polynomial, someone who knows k of the data-items can reconstruct the
polynomial, the points and thereby the data-items.
We publish:
– n and p
– n − k points ( j, f ( j)) on the polynomial, where j > n
Decryption can now be done by reconstructing the polynomial from the n − k
public points and k known points (n in total). One can then recalculate the
remaining points, and by applying the inverse of h recover the data items. This
requires that the data-items be encoded using a two-way function, which may
only be possible in case of small data-items, such as passwords. If we wish to use
a hash function to map the data-items to numbers, this approach is not feasible,
because points cannot be converted back to data items. An indirect and more
general approach, where an additional key is added, is defined below.
3.3 Indirect scheme
Assume that we have n data-items Di (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and a function h mapping data-
items to numbers below a prime p. The function h may for example be a hash
function, but this is not required for security. (The numbers must be uniformly
distributed though, to prevent an adversary from acquiring information from
correlations of data-items.) We choose a random key S from Zp. In general,
n + 1 points are necessary and sufficient to define or reconstruct a polynomial
of degree ≤ n. We now define a polynomial f of degree ≤ n in Zp by the n + 1
points (0,S) and (i, h(Di)).
Suppose that someone already knows (i, h(Di)) for k of the data-items. In
order to recover the full polynomial, including the key S, one needs n + 1 − k
additional points of the polynomial. Therefore, we publish:
– the data encrypted with key S
– n and p
– n + 1 − k points ( j, f ( j)) on the polynomial, where j > n
The data may be accompanied by a plaintext description, allowing agents to
find the data-set they want, as well as to specify the order of the items. Note
that the value of k can be derived from n and the number of published points,
and thus does not need to be published.
Since the (n+1−k) points on the polynomial made public represent additional
points on the polynomial, these will allow anyone who knows (i, h(Di)) for k
of the data-items to recover f from the (n + 1 − k) + k = n + 1 points in his
possession. He can then recover the key S from the point (0,S) and decrypt all
the data. The additional points made public thus provide information about
the relation between the data-items, without revealing additional information
about the data-items themselves, as shown in [9].
Although it would be possible to use a polynomial of degree n − 1 based
on the points (i, h(Di)) and then define S ≡ f (0), this would mean that the key
would depend on the data that the key is used to encrypt, leading to possible
weaknesses in the encryption scheme employed in practice. We therefore choose
to use a random key and polynomial of degree n.
3.4 Example
As an example, assume we have a data-set with the following description: Al-
ice’s passwords: (1, laptop), (2, mail), (3, social networking). We assume (without
loss of generality) that the passwords are numbers. For explanation purposes,
we use in the example the small values 24, 37 and 62 respectively. We also use
p = 67 here. We choose as the secret key S the value 45. Now, we have the
following points on the polynomial: (0, 45), (1, 24), (2, 37), (3, 62). Using a poly-
nomial curve fitting algorithm, we can find that f (x) = 41x3 + 28x2 + 44x + 45.
We wish to be able to recover one password as long as we remember the other
two. Therefore, we publish two additional points on the polynomial: (4,10) and
(5,60). This means that the following information is published:
– the description of the data-set: Alice’s passwords: (1, laptop), (2, mail), (3,
social networking)
– the data encrypted with key S (not shown here because of the simplicity of
the example)
– n = 3, p = 67
– the additional points (4,10) and (5,60)
Now assume that Alice lost her password 3 (her social networking password).
She remembers the other two passwords, though. She therefore possesses four
points on the polynomial: (1, 24), (2, 37), (4, 10) and (5, 60). This is enough to
obtain by polynomial curve fitting the polynomial f (x) = 41x3 + 28x2 + 44x+ 45.
Calculating f (0) = 45 gives Alice the key to decrypt all her passwords, including
the missing one. Note that all computations can be done offline after obtaining
the public data.
4 An order-invariant scheme
For obtaining an order-invariant scheme, we apply the set difference construc-
tion of a secure sketch from [1]. For the direct scheme, assume again that we
have an injective two-way function h mapping data-items to numbers below a
prime p. Here, the secret values h(Di) are encoded as the x-coordinates for which
the value of a polynomial f coincides with the value of a polynomial g. Since
the values are encoded as x-coordinates as opposed to the y-coordinates in the
previous scheme, their order is unimportant.
In [1], Reed-Solomon error correction is used to account for possibly incor-
rect set elements that are supplied in the decoding stage. Because we are not
interested in error correction here, we can leave out this possibility. For decryp-
tion, one should input k values which are all correct. This allows us to simplify
the scheme from [1] as follows.1
The encryption algorithmEnc now takes the following steps (again working
in polynomials over Zp):
1. Choose a secret polynomial g of degree k − 1 at random;
2. Calculate and publish the unique monic polynomial f of degree exactly n
by solving f (h(Di)) = g(h(Di)) for all Di. Publish k as well.
Decryption now works as follows:
1. Reconstruct g by solving f (h(Di)) = g(h(Di)) for all known items;
2. Find the remaining values for which f (h(x)) = g(h(x)); these are the other
data-items.
Since there is no error correction needed, there is minimal entropy loss. That is
to say, given k − 1 values for which f (x) = g(x), one learns nothing about the
remaining root of f (x) − g(x).
It is also possible to use this scheme for indirect data-based access control. In
[1] it is shown that a secure sketch can be turned into a fuzzy extractor. A fuzzy
extractor outputs a secure key based on the input of the secure sketch. When
we turn the secure sketch, in our case (Enc,Dec), into a fuzzy extractor, we can
thus obtain a key for indirect data-based access control. Alternatively, an extra
data-item may be added that represents the key for decrypting the data (as we
did in the ordered scheme).
5 Implementation
A prototype of the schemes discussed above has been implemented in Java,
for demonstration purposes (approximately 2,000 LOC). The implementation
includes polynomial interpolation as well as calculating the roots of polynomials
1 In a later version of their publication [2], the authors use a deterministic rather than
a probabilistic variant of their algorithm. The following algorithms can be adapted
accordingly.
inZp[x]. For the latter, the Cantor-Zassenhaus probabilistic algorithm was used,
which calculates the roots in O(n3 log(p)) operations in Zp [10]. It is assumed
that the polynomial is square-free, i.e. Di , D j. The implementation and source
code will be made available upon request.
6 Extensions for asymmetry
In the symmetric version of data-based access control, the encryption is symmet-
ric: there is no distinction between keys and data in what one already knows. In
this sense, any data may serve as part of a key for recovering other data. Also,
it may be imposed that two or more keys be known in order to read certain
data. Conversely, this also allows one to recover an additional key if one knows
the other keys and the data. This is obviously not a universal solution; in some
applications this symmetry is undesirable, for example when privacy-sensitive
data is used to gain access. Also in traditional encryption, allowing access to
data based on a key does not usually imply allowing access to the key based on
the data. Privacy-sensitive data and keys may thus need additional protection,
by introducing asymmetry in the policies.
There are at least two ways to introduce asymmetry into data-based access
control:
– Give the data-items different weights. This can be done by multiple levels
of indirect encryption, in which different combinations of data-items lead
to different partial keys. The keys can then be combined to reconstruct the
main key for decryption. For example, the policy could be that if you have
a, b, c you can get d, e, and vice versa. Now we create three fuzzy extractors:
one that creates a key from a, b, c, one that creates a key from d, e and one
that creates the main key from any one of the aforementioned keys.
– Use the hashes to keep certain parts of the encryption one-way. If the func-
tion h mapping data-items to numbers is a hash function, we can assume
that it is infeasible to reconstruct Di from h(Di). If we do not include certain
data-items in the published encrypted data, this directly implies that these
data-items can serve only as credentials, and cannot be recovered by means
of the secure sketch. Only the hash can be reconstructed. For example, the
policy could be that if you have a and b, you can get c, if you have a and c,
you can get b, but if you have b and c, you can’t get a. If we use hashes and
publish only the encryption of b and c, this policy is satisfied.
Note that the one-way property can also be achieved by multiple-level encryp-
tion. In the last example, one can again create three fuzzy extractors, in which
the two upper-level ones create a key from a and b, and a and c, respectively.
These ideas can be starting points for further research.
7 Strengths and weaknesses
As far as we are aware, this paper is the first to introduce the idea of data-
based access control. In a de-perimeterised world, this approach may help in
putting the protection as close to the data as possible, i.e. having the data protect
themselves. Compared to sticky policies and attribute-based encryption, this
approach has the advantage that it does not need to rely on a separate key
authority, because the data themselves allow for recovering the appropriate
keys.
The fact that the security depends on data-items is both the main strength and
the main weakness of this approach. In contrast to attribute-based encryption,
we do not need to rely on a trusted key authority in order to distribute keys
based on attributes, because in our case the attributes are data, and serve as keys
themselves. This also means, however, that we cannot control the uniformity
of the distribution of the key material. This means that the security is only as
strong as the entropy in the data used. If k = 2 and it is easy to guess two
of the data-items, the others are not secure anymore. It is therefore important
to develop guidelines on which parameters to choose for the schemes (which
items to combine in an encryption, the value of k).
In combination with fuzzy extractors [1], the approach may allow for retriev-
ing data-sets of which items are only approximately known (each item may be
slightly wrong). The fuzzy extractor is then used as the function h mapping
data-items to numbers. For example, I may supply four passwords to recover
my fifth one, and I am allowed make an error of 1 character in each of the
passwords. Of course, this comes at the cost of some entropy loss. Also, Reed-
Solomon error correction may be used to introduce the property that the set of
required items is only approximately known (some items may be completely
wrong). For example, I may supply four passwords, and if three of them are
correct, I get all my five passwords.
After downloading the encrypted data-set, all computations can be done
offline, without the need of a third party. Still, it may be possible that an ad-
versary learns the value of a certain h(Di) without knowing Di. For protection
against this threat, one could use a salt in the function h, to make sure that h(Di)
is different for each data-set the data-item is included in. Whether h could also
be a probabilistic function may be a question for further research.
Moreover, the schemes introduced here may not be the most efficient. Re-
search is therefore needed into alternative schemes and comparison of their
properties in terms of security and efficiency. This research should also address
the scalability of the different methods. In this paper, the aim was only to provide
the framework and a proof-of-concept.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced the concept of data-based access control. This is a
generalised form of de-perimeterised security in which the possibility for recov-
ering protected data depends on the data one already knows. More specifically,
we introduced the problem of recovering n data-items if one knows k of them,
and not learning anything if one knows fewer than k. This problem is similar to
a secure sketch, but it does not inherently involve error correction, and the ap-
plication area is different. We also introduced possible solutions to this problem
based on polynomial interpolation and secure sketches, and suggested some
applications. Further research in this new paradigm should reveal alternative
and possibly more efficient schemes, as well as additional applications.
In the future, it would be useful to define other forms of data-based access
control than (k,n) threshold schemes. Also, it should be investigated how ap-
plications, such as password recovery, can be implemented securely in practice.
Another open question is how to deal with propagation of access: if an addi-
tional data item is recovered, this may in its turn give access to more data items.
This may also affect revocation of policies: how can one be sure that users that
should not have access anymore do not possess all the required data to gain
access? Intuitively, one may add . Further research will investigate how this
affects policies.
In this paper, we have focused on confidentiality as a security property.
It may also be possible to use data-based security for integrity purposes, in
the form of data-based signatures. An additional question that needs to be
addressed is how signing with a certain key proves knowledge of the associated
data.
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